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by Max Stul Oppenheimer, 
Venable, Baetjer and Howard 
and Paul Mark Sandler, 
Cohan, Altman and Sandler 
"[M]ore mischief has come to good 
men by these kind of approvements by 
false accusations of desperate villians 
than of benefit to the public of the dis-
covery and convicting of real offenders." 
Sir Mathew Hale (1609-1676) 
History of the Pleas of the 
Crown, P. 226 (1778 Ed.) 
~ While the grant of immunity in the 
course of criminal trials has concerned 
the judiciary since the time of Mathew 
Hale, it has now captured public atten-
tion with the granting of immunity by 
prosecutors in connection with the re-
cent trials of once highly respected politi-
cal figures. Typically a prosecutor offers 
immunity to one or more potential de-
fendants, (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Witness Defendants"), in order to ob-
tain their testimony against another de-
fendant, (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Target Defendant"). While there has 
been much commentary on the implica-
tions of immunity for the Witness Defen-
dant, this article focuses on the implica-
tions of such grants of immunity for the 
Target Defendant. * 
These implications manifest them-
selves in two significant instances. First, 
assume A and B are indicted for a crime 
which A and C committed and A has 
agreed to testify against B in return for 
immunity. Although C can establish B's 
innocence by testifying that C and A 
committed the crime, he refuses to do so 
unless he can obtain immunity. It has 
generally been held, as discussed below, 
that B may not grant C immunity*, and 
therefore, B may not obtain C's tes-
timony. This situation raises the question 
whether B's right to due process is vio-
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lated because of the possibility of his 
conviction resulting from the inability of 
bringing forth exculpatory testimony 
from C. Second, as discussed below, 
prosecutorial immunity is a creature of 
statute. Where no statute exists, a prose-
cutor has no authority to grant immu-
nity. Often, where no immunity statute 
exists, a prosecutor enters an agreement 
not to prosecute a Witness Defendant in 
exchange for inculpatory testimony 
against a Target Defendant. This ac-
complishes the same result as a formal 
grant of immunity and imposes upon the 
target defendant such burdens as does 
the formal grant of immunity. 
The exchange of immunity raises the 
threshold question of whether selectivity 
in prosecution is consistent with equal 
protection. While this argument has 
been advanced, it has uniformly been 
held that a difference in treatment by the 
government in the prosecution of a case 
is not necessarily a violation of equal pro-
tection. * 
It is the thesis of this article that where 
the prosecutor has a statutory right to 
grant immunity the defense should have 
a comparable right and that prosecution 
should not be permitted to be based on 
testimony obtained by non-statutory 
grants of immunity. First, however, we 
turn to the origin of immunity and briefly 
trace it from its common law beginnings 
to its modern usage to set the perspec-
tive of this article. 
~ Approvement was one of the ear-
liest incentives devised by English 
Common Law to elicit the testimony of 
an offender against his accomplices. 
Under early common law an individual 
indicted and in custody of the sheriff 
could confess and accuse his ac-
complices. The court, in its discretion, 
could accept the confession and permit 
the individual confessing guilt to be 
an "approver"; in such a case the ac-
complice, not the approver, was tried. 
Variations in the institutions of ap-
provement permitted the approver to 
challenge the accomplice to trial by bat-
tle. If the accomplice were found guilty, 
the approver was pardoned; if the ac-
complice were found not guilty, the ap-
prover was hanged. * The practice of ap-
provement "with its conditions that the 
appellee could claim a trial by battle and 
that grace to the approver should be de-
pendent on his conviction of his as-
sociate in crime, was plainly at variance 
with modern sentiments and habits, and 
the consequence was that it passed out 
of use." * However, other incentives 
were devised to obtain the testimony of 
an offender against his accomplices. 
Lord Mansfield noted the existence of 
rewards, statutory pardons, and the 
concept of an equitable claim for mercy 
by one who gave evidence against an 
accomplice. * 
If Prosecutorial Immunity is to be jus-
tified as an outgrowth of these institu-
tions, it must be recognized that the or-
ganizational structure of criminal pro-
secution in England is notably different 
from that in the United States. A distin-
gUishing feature of prosecution in Eng-
land is private prosecution: if the English 
attorney general declines to initiate a 
prosecution, the victim of the alleged 
crime has the right to do so. * Thus, al-
though the English attorney general 
could order a Nolle Prosequi of a 
prosecution, his decision not to prose-
cute does not confer immunity as it 
would in the United States. In fact, the 
great majority of prosecutions are pre-
sented by police offers rather than the at-
torney general, whose main function is 
to prosecute certain serious crimes and 
certain cases referred to him by govern-
ment departments and local authorities. 
Glanville Williams suggests that one rea-
son for the wide discretion within the of-
fice of the Common Law Prosecutors is 
this feature of private prosecution. * 
~ The concept of a public official as 
the prime prosecutor of criminal cases 
was a creation of the American judicial 
system. Connecticut is recorded to have 
created the first public prosecutor as 
early as 1704. * The Judiciary Act of 
1789, Section 30 provided that the 
United States would be represented 
by a U.S. Attorney, later the Attorney 
General. (See State v. Hunter, 10 Md. 
App. 300 (1970), for a history of prose-
cutorial developments in the State of 
Maryland. The Court pointed out that 
the office of the State's Attorney was 
carved from the Common Law Office of 
Attorney General, but numerous legisla-
tive enactments defined the position.) 
The United States Attorney first began 
to control local district attorneys at the 
time of the American Civil War. Several 
factors might have contributed to the 
failure of the American Legal System to 
adopt a Common Law System of private 
prosecution. First, the American prosecu-
tor is depicted as a combination of the 
powers and duties of the English Attor-
ney General and the French Procureur 
Du Roi. Second, it was felt that the office 
of the prosecutor must be fair and inde-
pendent, which a private person could 
not be. (E.g. Bienel v. State, 71 Wis. 
444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888), wherein the 
Court commented that the public prose-
cutor could never be promoted by the 
conviction of the innocent, and that the 
duty of the prosecutor could never be 
fulfilled by the conduct of prosecution by 
paid attorneys of parties who, for pas-
sion, prejudice or even honest belief in 
the guilt of the accused would be desir-
ous of procuring his prosecution. ) A third 
factor might be the exasperation of the 
American Common Law with the result 
of irresponsible practice of law by Court 
officials and "pettifoggers." (This very 
interesting epoch in the development of 
American law is described by Roscoe 
Pound in, The Lawyer From Antiquity to 
Modern Times, West Publishing Co. 
(1953), p. 135. Dean Pound pOinted out 
that the pettifogger stage followed "an 
attempt to get on without lawyers" by 
the colonists.) 
The need for Prosecutorial Immunity 
in the United States emerged not as a 
matter of royal grace, but rather as an 
outgrowth of the Fifth Amendment pro-
vision of the United States Constitution 
that "no person shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." An accomplice could not be 
compelled to testify against his cohorts if 
in so doing he might incriminate himself. 
Prosecutors seeking testimony against 
a Target Defendant attempted to satisfy 
the Fifth Amendment right of the testify-
ing witness by agreeing not to prosecute 
him. It was argued that this removed the 
risk of self-incrimation and, therefore, 
permitted compulsion of testimony. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held 
that the prosecutor had no inherent au-
thority to bestow immunity and, there-
fore, a witness could refuse to testify re-
gardless of such an agreement. * With the 
emergence of immunity statutes, the Fifth 
Amendment right of the testifying wit-
ness could be overcome. These statutes 
supplied the prosecutor with authority to 
grant immunity. A testifying witness 
could be compelled to give inculpatory 
evidence against a Target Defendant if 
he were first guaranteed that no self-
incriminating use would be made of his 
testimony. 
The scope of immunity constitution-
ally required to satisfy the Fifth Amend-
ment has had an interesting develop-
ment. (For a detailed discussion, see 
Shapiro, Adequacy Under Federal Con-
stitution of Immunity Granted in Lieu of 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 32 
L.Ed. 2d 869. Annotation). In Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock (142 U.S. 547, 1892) 
the United States Supreme Court invali-
dated an early immunity statute which 
only gave an accused "use immunity." 
Thi; type of immunity prohibits the use 
of the testimony itself (although it does 
not prohibit the use of testimony derived 
from the compelled testimony) in a sub-
sequent prosecution. In Ullman v. Uni-
ted States* the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the constitUtionality of a 
statute which provided for "transac-
tional immunity." This type of immunity 
prohibits the prosecution of the witness 
for any transaction as to which he is tes-
tifying under compulsion. Finally, inKas-
tigar v. United States (406 U.S. 441, 
1972) the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a much 
narrower form of immunity than transac-
tional immunity: "use and derivative use 
immunity." This type of immunity pro-
hibits not only the direct use of the tes-
timony, as prohibited in the statute in-
validated by Counselman v. Hitchcock, 
but also prohibits the use of any tes-
timony derived from the compelled tes-
timony. 
Following the decision in Kastigar, 
Congress enacted 18 U.S.c.A. Section 
6001-6005, which repealed prior im-
munity statutes and substituted in their 
place a general "use and derivative use" 
immunity statute. This statute covers all 
proceedings before courts, federal agen-
cies, and congressional committees, and 
prohibits a witness' refusal to testify on 
the basis of his privilege and includes a 
prohibition of the use of testimony which 
he has furnished under compulsion 
against the witness in any criminal case. 
The general procedure for compelling 
testimony under this action is that aU. S. 
Attorney, with the approval of the Attor-
ney General, makes application to a fed-
eral judge for the grant of immunity to a 
witness who' 'has refused or is likely to 
refuse to testify or provide other informa-
tion on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination." Once the order is is-
sued by the judge the witness may not 
refuse to testify, under penalty of being 
in contempt of court. 
~ Unlike the federal statutes, the 
Maryland immunity statutes are not 
found in one central location; rather, 
they are scattered throughout the Mary-
land Code and arranged according to 
the substantive aspect of law to which 
the statute applies. A proposed general 
immunity statute (House Bill 541) was 
rejected by the General Assembly in 
1972. The Maryland immunity statutes 
include granting immunity to witnesses 
for testimony in prosecutions for the fol-
lowing: 
a) bribery of public officials 
(Article 27, Section 23) 
b) bribery in athletic contests 









conspiracy to bribe 
(Article 27, Section 39) 
gambling 
(Article 27, Section 262) 
obtaining liquor by a 
minor 
(Article 27, Section 400) 
sabotage 
(Article 27, Section 540) 
violation of fair election 
practices 
(Article 33, Section 26) 
control of dangerous sub-
stances 
(Article 27, Section 298) 
violations of insurance 
law 
(Article 48A, Section 28) 
violation of unemploy-
ment insurance law 
(Article 95A, Section 12J) 
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k) violation of workmen's 
compensation law 
(Article 101, Section 8) 
l) violation of Retail Sales 
Tax Act 
(Article 81, Section 359) 
and for testimony in certain supplemen-
tary or discovery proceedings (Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings, § 9-119). 
A review of the Maryland immunity 
statues reveals that there is no uniformity 
as to the type of immunity to be granted 
under these statutes. For example, Article 
27, Section 540; Article 40A, Section 
359; Article 95A, Section 12J; and Arti-
cle 101, Section 8, appear to grant 
"transactional immunity" while Article 
81, Section 359 and Article 75, Section 
74 appear to grant simply "use immu-
nity". Although there appear to have 
been no challenges to these statutes' 
constitutionality, the decision in Coun-
selman v. Hitchcock seems to suggest 
that the latter statutes are constitutionally 
insufficient. (Immunity does not violate 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
However State immunity statutes must 
comply with the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission 378 
U.S. 52). The decision in Kastigar v. Uni-
ted States seems to indicate that the 
former statutes grant broader immunity 
than constitutionally necessary. 
Like the federal immunity statutes, 
most of the Maryland statutes require an 
application by the prosecutor to the 
court for the granting of immunity. 
However, immunity granted pursuant to 
Article 27, Section 298, sub-section C, 
the Controlled Dangerous Substance 
Act, does not require the prosecutor to 
obtain an order of court. This section has 
been interpreted as being self-executing. 
(Roll v. State, 15 Md. App. 31, As to the 
special problems of such "automatic 
immunity" statute, See McCormick, 
Evicence § 143 footnote 14.) 
~ While statutory immunity may be 
considered the only legitimate form of 
immunity, the same result is often ac-
complished through a prosecutor's 
agreement not to institute criminal pro-
ceedings. Such non-statutory immunity, 
may take the form of the prosecutor en-
tering a Nolle Prosequi, accomplished 
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with the consent of the court or an accept-
ance of a guilty plea to a lesser offense. * 
From the viewpoint of a Target Defen-
dant, it is irrelevant whether the Testify-
ing Witness has been granted immunity 
or given an agreement not to prosecute; 
the effect is the same. Even absent 
statutory authority, the witness has an 
equitable claim to immunity from pro-
secution, similar to the eighteenth cen-
tury equity claim commented upon by 
Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Rudd. * While 
this non-statutory* claim does not bar 
prosecution as an automatic right, as a 
practical matter an accomplice who has 
testified pursuant to an agreement with 
the prosecutor will generally go unpro-
secuted. * 
Non-statutory immunity is sometimes 
justifed as being an outgrowth of pre-
secutorial discretion, derived from the 
discretionary powers inherited from the 
english Attorney General. In the United 
States, unlike in Great Britain, if a prose-
cutor decides not to prosecute, the pri-
vate citizen generally has no further re-
course. * Discretion is so established in 
the U.S. that if two individuals are 
equally deserving of prosecution, the 
prosecutor can determine to prosecute 
one and not the other even if the motiva-
tion for the distinction stems from con-
siderations extreneous to justice, such as 
personal dislike of an individual or politi-
cal advantage. * If the prosecutor de-
clines to prosecute the courts have no 
power to compel initiation of criminal 
proceedings. * This lack of power to 
compel initiation of proceedings results 
in the de facto power of the prosecutor to 
grant immunity even absent statutory 
authorization. 
~ It has been held that Statutory Im-
munity per se does not violate the Due 
Process clause of the U.S. Constitution. * 
However, testimony obtained in ex-
change for immunity should be viewed 
with distrust. * In the ordinary case of a 
witness testifying, the testimony serves 
an informative purpose only and the 
witness' interest is in whether the trier of 
fact believes his testimony. However, in 
the case of a Witness Defendant, the tes-
timony serves a dual purpose. Not only 
does it inform the trier of fact as to the is-
sues in the instant case, but it also sets 
the limits of the witness' benefit: the 
more he tells, the broader is his immu-
nity. Thus, the witness' interest is not 
only in the truth of his testimony, but also 
in the breadth of his immunity. As long 
as the witness remains silent, discovery 
of independent evidence may result in 
his prosecution. But to the extent he tes-
tifies under a grant of "transactional im-
munity," he insulates himself, and even 
where he only obtains' 'use and deriva-
tive use immunity," he places a burden 
upon the prosecutor to establish the in-
dependent sourse of inculpatory tes-
timony in a subsequent prosecution. 
Under these circumstances, it is arguable 
that the temptation to commit perjury 
may be so strong as to require special 
treatment, much as exclusion of the sus-
pect testimony; or, if the inherent suspi-
cion of the testimony of self-interested 
witnesses is viewed as going only to the 
weight of evidence, an instruction to the 
jury as to the circumstances surrounding 
such testimony should suffice. * 
Apart from the untrustworthiness of 
immunized testimony, there is a more 
serious due process issue. Consider 
again the hypothetical situation set forth 
in the introduction: A and B are indicted 
for a crime which A and C committed 
and A has agreed, pursuant to statute, to 
testify against B in return for immunity. 
Although C can establish B's innocence 
by testifying that C and A committed the 
crime, he refuses to do so unless he can 
obtain immunity. If B cannot grant C 
immunity and therefore cannot obtain 
C's exculpatory testimony, B's right to 
due process is denied because he is de-
nied effective confrontation, effective 
compulsory process, the right to obtain 
exculpatory evidence, and the right to a 
presumption of innocence. 
In Chambers v. Mississippi, * the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a defendant 
was denied a fair trial when he was de-
nied the opportunity under the hearsay 
rule to introduce evidence that another 
had admitted committing the crime as 
well as the opportunity to cross-examine 
the alleged perpetrator of the crime. Ef-
fective confrontation of witnesses in-
volves more than the right to ask ques-
tions on cross-examination. It is 
suggested that it must include the right to 
produce independent testimony bearing 
on the credibility of direct testimony. * 
In our assumed factual situation, A has 
committed a crime. It cannot be as-
sumed that he would shrink from perjury 
in order to save himself from prosecu-
tion. The temptation to commit perjury is 
all the greater if A knows that the only 
person who can contradict him, C, will 
be unable to testify for fear of his own 
prosecution. Thus, B should be permit-
ted to call C and introduce testimony in 
contradiction to A's testimony, because 
there is no other meaningful way to con-
front A. 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides that the accused 
shall have compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor. That clause 
provides for more than the right of a de-
fendant to have a witness brought into 
the courtroom. In Washington v. 
Texas, * a state statute permitted co-
participants in a crime to testify for the 
prosecution but not for one another. The 
U.S. Supreme Court held this statute 
unconstitutional despite the state's ar-
gument that it had not refused the right 
to confrontation. The Court forcused on 
the question of admissibility and held 
that the Sixth Amendment right is at least 
broad enough to put a witness on the 
stand. In Bray v. Peyton, * the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
relying on Washington v. Texas, re-
versed a defendant's conviction when 
the government incarcerated an indict-
ted defense witness, thereby depriving 
the accused of the benefit of what he 
claimed was exculpatory testimony. In 
Bray, the defendant was on trial for 
statutory rape, and intended to call a 
witness who would testify to the witness' 
prior illicit relations with the victim to es-
tablish that the victim was a consenting 
lewd female. The witness attended the 
trial and was arrested and charged with 
assault upon the victim and thus was 
prevented from giving exculpatory tes-
timony. 
The question then is whether the con-
stitutional guarantee of the right of con-
frontation is cognizable only when de-
nied explicity, as in Washington v. 
Texas; or whether an equally effective 
indirect means of denying the defense 
the right to put a witness on the stand is 
also unconstitutional. Under the latter in-
terpretation, refusal to grant immunity to 
witnesses favorable to the defense 
would be unconstitutional. It is unrea-
sonable to expect that a defense witness 
would willingly testify if such testimony 
would cost his freedom. The threat of 
criminal prosecution is an equally effec-
tive method of blocking the admission of 
favorable testimony as the statute held 
unconstitutional in Washington v. Texas. 
Refusal to permit the defendant to ob-
tain testimony by granting immunity 
further collides with the constitutional 
rights of the Target Defendant by creat-
ing a situation which tolerates the sup-
pression of exculpatory evidence. It is 
settled that a prosecutor may not know-
ingly permit a witness to testify falsely, 
Alcorta v. Texas, * even when the falsity 
of the testimony goes only to the credibil-
ity of the witness. * Moreover, the prose-
cutor may not suppress facts favoring the 
accused, Brady v. Maryland* and Giles 
v. Maryland. * 
In Brady, the Court stated' ' ... we now 
hold that the suppression by the pro-
secution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violated due process 
where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion." * Denying the Target Defendant 
the right to grant immunity allows the 
prosecutor to suppress potentially ex-
culpatory evidence, the result con-
demned in Brady. 
The underlying assumption in an ad-
versary system is that when both sides of 
a controversy are fully presented to an 
impartial trier of fact, a just result will be 
reached. InDennis v. United States * the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
" ... it is especially important that the de-
fense, the judge and the jury should 
have the assurance that the doors that 
may lead to truth have been unlocked. 
In our adversary system for determining 
guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable 
for the prosecution to have exclusive ac-
cess to a store house of relevant fact. Ex-
ceptions to this are justifiable only by the 
clearest and most compelling considera-
tions." 
No court has yet faced the issue of 
whether due process requires the state to 
permit a Target Defendant the right to 
grant immunity to a witness in the situa-
tion where the government grants its 
witnesses immunity. That problem did 
arise in Gregorio v. United States. * Dur-
ing the course of the trial the government 
granted immunity to one of its witnesses 
and defense counsel had called to the 
stand a witness who invoked the fifth 
amendment. Subsequently, the defense 
counsel inquired of the witness whether 
he would testify if granted immunity, 
even though the government had made 
Chris Michael 
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known its refusal to grant immunity. De-
fense counsel did not pursue the request 
for immunity and withdrew his witness. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
however, refused to consider the ques-
tion, resting instead on the technical 
ground that the defendant failed prop-
erly to raise the argument at trial and did 
not preserve the record for appeal. 
It is suggested that defense counsel 
did establish a sufficient record in Gre-
gorio for appellate review. * However, 
to avoid the problem, counsel should file 
a pre-trial motion to compel the state to 
grant immunity to the defendant's wit-
ness. This motion should include a re-
quest to suppress the testimony of the 
government's witness if the government 
does not grant the immunity requested 
for the defense witness. * 
A problem could arise if a defense wit-
ness, who cooperated prior to trial, sud-
denly balks when called to the stand and 
claims the fifth amendment privilege. 
The question arises whether defense 
counsel could confer immunity on the 
recalcitrant witness at that point. Cer-
tainly the defense is in a much weaker 
posture, because the remedy of sup-
pression is unavailable; although, the 
power of the court to declare a mistrial or 
the court's contempt power might be 
utilized. Whenever defense counsel in-
tends to examine a witness who might 
claim the fifth amendment, the appro-
priate motion to compel immunity 
should be filed prior to trial; this would 
protect counsel from the last minute 
change of heart. 
Likewise, the defense has a more dif-
ficult burden in insisting on a grant of 
immunity where the prosecution has not 
done so. There is an appealing sym-
metry to the proposition that whatever 
tool the prosecution may use should also 
be available to the defense; where the 
prosecution has not used that tool, the 
symmetry argument works against the 
defense. For example, in Earl v. United 
States * the defendant asked that immu-
nity be granted to his witness, although 
the government had not offered immu-
nity to any witness. The court held that it 
lacked the power to compel the prosecu-
tor, who was an agent of the Executive 
Branch of the government, to exercise 
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his power to grant immunity. 
Judge Leventhal, writing a dissenting 
opinion to the court's decision denying a 
rehearing en bane, stated that perhaps 
the problem posed by the inability of the 
defendant to compel testimony could be 
solved by a charge bringing to the atten-
tion of the jury the fact that the govern-
ment had refused to grant immunity to a 
witness who the defendant claimed 
could exonerate him. This solution falls 
short of solving the problem, because it 
still deprives the Target Defendant of the 
right to put forth all the relevant evidence 
in his defense. The jury should not be al-
lowed to speculate as to what evidence 
the miSSing witness would proffer; in 
fact, it would be improper for the jury to 
do so. See Bruton v. United States, * 
wherein the United States Supreme 
Court indicated that jury instructions 
cannot always be employed to correct a 
flaw in procedure that affects constitu-
tional rights. Furthermore, the jury in-
struction suggestion improperly shifts 
the resolution of the dilemma to the 
shoulders of the defendant. The initial 
burden is on the government to demon-
strate clear and compelling considera-
tions for depriving the Target Defendant 
of his right to unlock the doors of truth, 
Dennis v. United States. * 
"The naive assumption that prejudi-
cial effects can be overcome by instruc-
tions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers 
know to be unmitigated fiction ... " If the 
defense cannot compel exculpatory tes-
timony because it cannot confer immu-
nity, a jury instruction would require 
consideration of testimony that was not 
produced and would force the jury into 
unpermitted speculation on matters that 
have not been introduced into evidence. 
At least in cases where there is statutory 
authorization for prosecutorial immu-
nity, it is arguable that the defense 
should be afforded a comparable right 
to immunize witnesses even if the pro-
secution has not exercised its right to do 
so. Rights rather than the exercise of 
those rights should be equivalent. The 
mere fact that the prosecutor chooses 
not to exercise his right should not force 
the defense to forego its right any more 
than the defense could preclude the 
prosecutor from cross-examining the de-
fendant on the grounds that the defense 
had not cross-examined any prosecu-
tion witnesses. 
Two arguments might be advanced as 
"compelling considerations" to justify 
denying the Target Defendant the right 
to compel testimony on his behalf: the 
spectre of the immunity bath and the 
threat of perjury. The immunity bath 
problem would have been more troubl-
ing prior to Kastigar v. United States. * 
Prior cases had indicated that in order to 
overcome the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, it was con-
stitutionally necessary to grant' 'transac-
tional immunity," that is, to insulate the 
witness against prosecution for any 
transaction as to which he testified. Thus 
there was a real danger that a defendant 
could grant blanket immunity to anyone 
he chose and that the Target Defendant 
could permit a co-defendant to testify 
and thus preclude a prosecution of the 
co-defendant. Under Kastigar, the stan-
dard for overcoming the fifth amend-
ment privilege is "use and derivative use 
immunity," thus limiting the witness' 
immunity to the prevention of the use of 
any of his testimony or its fruits in a sub-
sequent prosecution. The post-Kastigar 
federal statute provides for' 'use and de-
rivative use immunity." 
Thus the government is still free to 
prosecute a witness if it can affirmatively 
establish an independent basis for its in-
formation. It should be apparent that the 
prosecution is not prejudiced by the de-
fense's grant of "use and derivative use 
immunity" since the only restriction on 
future prosecution is that the govern-
ment may not use, directly or indirectly, 
the testimony of the witness against him-
self. This is precisely the same restriction 
that would apply in prosecution of the 
witness in any event; the fifth amend-
ment would, even absent the grant of 
immunity, deprive the government of 
precisely the evidence which the defense 
grant of immunity does. 
The perjury problem involves the fear 
that a Target Defendant will enlist the 
support of a co-consipirator to testify 
falsely on his behalf. The risk of false tes-
timony from a prosecution witness is at 
least as great since he is, by definition, 
vulnerable to indictment. Judge Leven-
thai in Earl v. United States* suggested 
that the solution to that problem is an 
appropriate instruction advising the jury 
that in considering the credibility of the 
prosecution witness' testimony, it may 
consider the fact that the witness has 
been granted immunity for his tes-
timony. Presumably this solution could 
also be applied to an immunized defense 
witness. The underlying reasoning 
which leads to the suspicion that the de-
fendant will solicit perjured testimony 
appears to be based on the notion that 
the accused is suspect and therefore tes-
timony in his behalf is suspect. The de-
fendant is presumed innocent and there-
fore testimony on his behalf should not 
be presumed entitled to less respect than 
testimony offered by the prosecution. 
~ A prosecutor's offer of immunity 
without statutory authority violates due 
process when the fruits of that offer are 
used to convict a Target Defendant. Due 
process is violated not because the pros-
ecutor's offer of immunity to the Witness 
Defendant is itself unlawful, * but be-
cause the prosecutor thus unlawfully ob-
tains evidence against the Target Defen-
dant. As set forth above, a prosecutor 
has no inherent authority to grant im-
munity. The legislature has defined 
those certain areas in which the prosecu-
tor may not only voluntarily limit his own 
actions, but also may absolutely fore-
close future prosecution by coordinate 
and successor prosecutors. * When a 
prosecutor goes beyond those bounds, 
he is intruding upon a field pre-empted 
by the legislature. 
Justice Field in a concurring opinion in 
US. V. San Jacinto Tin Co. * remarked: 
"I do not recognize the doctrine that 
the Attorney General takes any power 
by virtue of his office except what the 
Constitution and the laws confer. The 
powers of the executives of England 
are not invested in the executive offic-
ers of the llnited States."* 
When the prosecutor goes beyond 
legislatively-approved areas and the 
Target Defendant is convicted as a result 
of the unauthorized agreement not to 
prosecute, evidence is unlawfully ob-
tained and there is a violation of the 
Target Defendant's right to due process 
of law. In several analogous cases, to 
prevent incriminating evidence from 
being obtained by unlawful means, the 
courts have adopted a policy of exclud-
ing such evidence and the fruits 
thereof. * To prevent a prosecutor from 
offering immunity without statutory au-
thority and proceeding against the 
Target Defendant, a similar exclusionary 
rule should be applied. The defense at-
torney should raise this procedual point 
by an appropriate motion to suppress or 
a motion in limine. If the trial court rules 
adversely on the motion, the argument 
will be preserved for appeal. * 
~ A program for Maryland: Prosecu-
torial Immunity, as presently employed, 
raises serious questions and poses signi-
ficant challenges not only to the constitu-
tional framework of our legal system, but 
also to the basic philosophy of its appli-
cation. Ours is an accusatorial system. A 
presumably innocent person is charged 
with a crime and, upon being charged, is 
cloaked with a variety of protective 
rights. It is inconsistent with this protec-
tion that he does not have the right to 
compel exculpatory testimony by grant-
ing immunity, when the prosecutor has 
the right to compel inculpatory tes-
timony by granting immunity. The de-
nial of this right violates his right to due 
process. 
Although the spectre of the immunity 
bath and the threat of perjury are ad-
vanced as reasons for denying the ac-
cused the right to grant immunity, these 
reasons do not withstand scrutiny. Kas-
tigar and its progeny of "use and deriva-
tive use" immunity statutes undermine 
the immunity bath argument, and the 
threat of perjury by defense-immunized 
witnesses cannot be demonstrated to be 
greater than that of prosecution-
immunized witnesses. 
In light of the weaknesses of the pres-
ent system of immunity, changes are in 
order. Grants of immunity absent statu-
tory authorization are, under present 
Maryland law, unlawful. They must be 
di$ontinued. The Maryland immunity 
statutes are neither uniform nor in con-
formity with present constitutional stan-
dards. They should be revised to recog-
nize Kastigar and Counselman. In the 
process, the advisability of a general 
immunity statute should be considered. 
Although there do not appear to have 
been any attempts to so utilize them, 
several of the Maryland immunity stat-
utes may be broad enough to confer 
immunity-granting power on defen-
dants. However, the majority of the stat-
utes clearly grant such power to prose-
cutors only. There does not appear to be 
any justification for the differences in 
statutory language on this point. The stat-
utes should be uniform and should 
either grant the defendant the right to 
grant immunity or should deny the right 
to both defendant and prosecution. 
1. Immunity Granted without Statu-
tory Authorization 
Maryland law is clear that the prosecu-
tor has no inherent authority to grant 
immunity. However, as noted above, it 
is impossible to prevent a prosecutor 
from refUSing to initiate a criminal pro-
ceeding for whatever reason. Part of the 
solution must be a change in the 
philosophy of individual prosecutors. 
However, it is suggested that more ag-
gressive investigation of the cir-
cumstances surrounding prosecution 
testimony may provide defense attor-
neys with an avenue for suppressing 
such unauthorized immunized tes-
timony. 
2. Breadth of Immunity 
As set forth above, the Maryland im-
munity statutes provide for varying types. 
of immunity: "use," "use and derivative 
use," and "transactional." "Use" im~ 
munity is, under Counselman, constitu-
tionally insufficient; "use" immunity stat-
utes should therefore be revised rathe,r 
than waiting for a court challenge to their 
validity. "Transactional" immUl:ity is, 
under Ullman, constitutional, but Kas-
tigar indicates that a lesser grant will suf-
fice. The immunity bath has been raised 
as an argument against the defendant's 
granting immunity, but it has never been 
carried to its logical conclusion: the risk is 
present in prosecutorial grants of immu-
nity as well. There is a risk of immunity 
baths whenever "transactional" immu-
nity is granted. Therefore, unless there is 
a compelling reason to retain "transac-
tional" immunity, these statutes should 
be revised to provide only "use and de-
rivative use" immunity. 




There are two solutions to the due 
process problems raised above: deny 
the right to grant immunity to both sides 
or grant it to both sides. Simply abolish-
ing immunity is an unsatisfactory solu-
tion for other reasons,. though. As 
pointed out above, it is impossible to en-
tirely prevent the prosecutor from grant-
ing the functional eqUivalent of immu-
nity because of his unreviewable discre-
tion in initiating prosecutions. The best 
that can be done is to prevent him from 
absolutely barring other prosecutors 
from doing so. Furthermore, it is argu-
able that even where the prosecutor has 
no right to grant immunity, the defen-
dant's rights of confrontation and com-
pulsory process require that he have the 
right to do so. 
The language of some Maryland im-
munity statutes may, in fact, be broad 
enough to afford the defendant the 
power to confer immunity. For example, 
in the Prohibited Election Practices im-
munity section (Art. 33 § 26-16(a) a wit-
ness "in any criminal prosecution" may 
obtain "transactional" immunity. In the 
sale of liquor to minors section (Art 27 § 
400) "use" immunity may be conferred 
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on any minor furnishing testimony "".in 
the prosecution of any person for selling 
liquor to minors." While it may seem 
apparent that the intent was to use the 
word "prosecution" to mean the prose-
cutor's side of the case, it is arguable that 
"prosecution" means the entire case. 
This argument is reinforced by the fact 
that the legislature, in other sections of 
the Code, is explicit in limiting the right to 
grant immunity to the prosecutor. For 
Example, the Controlled Dangerous 
Substance Immunity section (Art 27 § 
298 and the Conspiracy to Bribe section 
(Art 27 § 39) provide immunity only for 
those who testify on behalf of the state. 
The Bribery in Athletic Contests section 
(Art 27 § 25) provides immunity only for 
those compelled to "testify against" the 
defendant. The Sabotage immunity sec-
tion (Art 27 § 540) provides immunity 
for those testimony is "required of him 
by the State." 
The fact that it is arguable that the right 
to compel testimony by granting immu-
nity may exist for defendants in certain 
prosecutions is hardly the solution to the 
due process problem, though. It merely 
emphasizes (if it does exist) the irrational-
ity of the present immunity system in 
Maryland. Why should prohibited elec-
tion practices and furnishing liquor to 
minors merit special treatment? 
The right of a criminal defendant to 
confer immunity when necessary to 
compel exculpatory testimony should be 
recognized as a general principal of law. 
Safeguards (such as limiting the scope of 
immunity to "relevant" or "necessary" 
testimony) may be appropriate, but the 
need for safeguards should not preclude 
the recognition of the right. 
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